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Lifetime Tax Benefits
by Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Mark J. Warshawsky
This paper addresses three questions related to limits on DC contributions.  The first is whether statutory
limits on tax-deductible contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans are likely to be binding,
focusing on households in various economic situations.  The second is how large is the tax benefit from
participating in defined contribution plans.  The third is how does the defined contribution tax benefit
depend on the level of lifetime income.  We find that the statutory limits bind those older middle-income
households who started their pension savings programs late in life, those who plan to retire early, single-
earner households, those who are not borrowing constrained, and those with rapid rates of real wage
growth.  Most households with high levels of earnings, regardless of age or situation, are also constrained
by the contribution limits.
Lower or middle-income two-earner households that can look forward to modest real earnings growth are
likely to be borrowing constrained for most of their pre-retirement years because of the costs of paying a
mortgage and sending children to college.  These households are not in a position to save the 25 percent
of earnings allowed as a contribution to DC plans.  Some of these middle-income households, however,
are constrained by the $10,500 limit on elective employee contributions to 401(k) plans if the households
have access to only these plans and their employers make no pension contributions for them.  The
borrowing constraints faced by many lower- and middle-income Americans means that contributions to
DC plans must come at the price of lower consumption when young and the benefit of higher
consumption when old.  Indeed, for a stylized household earning $50,000, consistently contributing 10
percent of salary to a DC plans that earns a 4 percent real return means consuming almost two times more
when old than when young.
Measured as a share of lifetime consumption, the tax benefit from participating in a DC plan can be
significant. Assuming annual contribution rates at the average of the maximum levels allowed by
employers in 401(k) plans and assuming a 4 percent real return on DC and non-DC assets, the benefit is 2
percent for two-earner households earning $25,000 per year, 3.4 percent for those earning $100,000 per
year, and 9.8 percent for those earning $300,000 per year.  Contribution ceilings limit the benefit at the
highest regions of the household earnings distribution. The extent of the benefit is also quite sensitive to
the assumed rate of return on DC and non-DC assets.I.    Introduction
It is now over a quarter of century since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).  This law regulates tax-favored vehicles for retirement saving, including defined contribution (DC)
pension accounts.  A key element of ERISA’s DC provisions is the setting of limits on the size of tax-
deductible contributions.  In both nominal and, especially, inflation-adjusted terms, these limits have been
tightened over the years.  Current rules allow workers and their employers jointly to contribute, on an annual
basis, the lesser of 25 percent of a worker’s earnings or $30,000 to a DC plan.  There is also a separate limit of
$10,500 on that part of the joint contribution (the elective contribution) made by employees.  In the case of
401(k)-type plans in which the employer makes no contribution, $10,500 is the relevant limit on contributions.
If the employer doesn’t sponsor a plan, a worker is limited to $2,000 in contributions to an IRA.
Congress is now considering legislation to increase the various limits on tax-deductible contributions
to retirement accounts.  The policymakers’ interest in this issue is understandable.  More and more workers are
saving for retirement primarily through DC and IRA plans.  And limiting contributions to retirement accounts
raises concerns about the adequacy of retirement saving.  These concerns arise, in part, from studies by
Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000), Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2000), and others suggesting that
many Americans are saving too little to sustain their current living standards in old age and the well-known
fact that many workers are not covered by either defined benefit or defined contribution pension plans.
Would raising the joint employer-employee contribution limit in DC plans matter? Or is the real issue
raising the elective employee or IRA limits, or the limits for older workers, or, indeed, simply getting
employers and participants who are now contributing below the limits to increase their contributions or to set
up retirement plans?  The government does provide a significant tax benefit for most households to encourage
full participation. Contributions to retirement plans are tax-deductible.  Although withdrawals are taxable,
there is no federal or state taxation of the capital income accrued prior to withdrawal.
1  Compared to saving
outside of retirement accounts, this deferral of tax payments gives workers an interest-free loan on the taxes
they would otherwise have paid on a) the original contribution plus b) all subsequent capital income earned on
                                                
1 This discussion abstracts from Roth IRAs.2
the contribution.  The result is that the capital income component of income taxation is effectively eliminated
for income earned and invested in retirement accounts.
Because the poor and the low-income face low rates of income taxation and have a significantly larger
share of their pre-retirement earnings replaced by Social Security, the DC joint employer-employee
contribution limits seem to have been set with the middle, upper-middle, and high-income classes in mind.
The goal of the joint limit appears to be to permit middle- and upper-middle class households to save
significant sums on a tax-favored basis to fund a comfortable retirement, while limiting the tax-break available
to the rich.  This approach also limits the short-term losses in aggregate tax revenues for the federal
government.
2
This paper addresses three questions related to limits on DC contributions.  The first is whether
statutory limits on tax-deductible contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans are likely to be binding,
focusing on households in various economic situations.  The second is how large is the tax benefit from
participating in defined contribution plans.  The third is how does the defined contribution tax benefit depend
on the level of lifetime income.  To be precise, we determine whether stylized households that differ by their
ages, levels of lifetime earnings, past pension coverage, planned retirement dates, and so on would want to
contribute more than the maximum allowable amounts.  We also measure, as a percent of lifetime
consumption, the lifetime tax benefit provided to households from participating in DC plans and show how
this benefit varies by level of lifetime earnings.  Stated differently, we calculate the percentage increase in the
present value of lifetime consumption of households resulting from participation in DC plans.
The methodology used in this paper is simulations, that is, to run a number of stylized households
through Economic Security Planner (ESPlanner), a sophisticated planning model of optimal saving and
consumption over the life cycle.  We use the model to evaluate the questions posed above, and, more broadly,
to discuss the current policy stance toward retirement saving.
                                                
2 DC contribution limits also constrain the amount of tax arbitrage possible under the system.   Tax arbitrage, in this
context, refers to borrowing on a tax-deductible basis and using the proceeds to make contributions.  Borrowing on a tax-
deductible basis means that interest paid on such borrowing is tax-deductible.  Because, as just indicated, interest earned
on funds invested in DC plans is effectively untaxed, tax arbitrage here amounts to borrowing on an after-tax basis and
lending on a pre-tax basis.  Current tax law permits deducting interest payments only on mortgages and home equity loans,
and therefore such tax arbitrage is constrained by the degree to which DC contributors can leverage their homes.3
We find that the statutory limits bind those older middle-income households who started their pension
savings programs late in life, those who plan to retire early, single-earner households, those who are not
borrowing constrained, and those with rapid rates of real wage growth.  Most households with high levels of
earnings, regardless of age or situation, are also constrained by the contribution limits.  Lower or middle-
income two-earner households that can look forward to modest real earnings growth are likely to be borrowing
constrained for most of their pre-retirement years because of the costs related paying a mortgage and to having
children who will go to college.  These households are not in a position to save the 25 percent of earnings
allowed as a contribution to DC plans.  Some of these middle-income households, however, are constrained by
$10,500 limit on elective employee contributions to 401(k) plans if the households have access to only these
plans and their employers make no pension contributions on their behalf.
The borrowing constraints faced by many lower- and middle-income Americans means that
contributions to DC plans come at the price of lower consumption when young and the benefit of higher
consumption when old.  Indeed, for a stylized household we consider, contributing 10 percent of salary to a
DC plans that earns a 4 percent real return means consuming almost two times more when old than when
young.
The tax benefit from participating in a DC plan can be significant.  Assuming annual contribution
rates at the average of the maximum levels allowed by employers and assuming a 4 percent real return on DC
and non-DC assets, the benefit is 2 percent for two-earner households earning $25,000 per year,
3.4 percent for those earning $100,000 per year, and 9.8 percent for those earning $300,000 per year.
Contribution limits effectively limit the benefit only at the highest regions of the household earnings
distribution. The extent of the benefit is also quite sensitive to the assumed rate of return on DC and non-DC
assets.
The significant value of the DC tax benefit combined with the distortions it conveys to age-
consumption profiles suggest the need to re-examine the structure of the tax preference provided to defined
contribution plans.  In theory, contribution limits to DC plans should be designed on a lifetime basis and reflect
the household’s history of contributions made and the extent of provisions already made for funding
retirement.  In practice, the administrative requirements and costs for this individualized approach are terribly4
high, and hence simple and “one-size-fits-all” rules must be designed.  Therefore, the practical implications of
our findings is that consideration should be given to higher contribution limits for older workers than younger
workers, unconstrained by non-discrimination requirements.  Similarly, consideration to an increase in the
401(k) and 403(b) contribution limits also seems appropriate, as many upper-middle-income households are
potentially constrained by them.  Furthermore, modification of the non-discrimination requirements to easily
allow age-weighted DC plans may be warranted given the general indication that savings should be more
concentrated in the ages just before retirement.   Fairness would seem to dictate that the benefits of
participation in tax-advantaged savings plans be widely shared by all workers regardless of whether their
employer sponsors a pension plan or not, and regardless of how much the employer contributes, if anything.
In the current setting, achieving more uniform treatment of employees could be accomplished by raising tax-
deductible IRA contribution limits.
The paper proceeds in Section II with a brief review of DC contribution limits.  Section III describes
ESPlanner.  Section IV considers the degree to which the DC limits are binding.  Section V shows how
participating in DC plans alters consumption growth over the life cycle for our stylized households.  Section
VI presents DC subsidy rates under alternative assumptions.  And Section VII summarizes and concludes the
study. 
II.   Limits on DC Contributions
Section 415 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by ERISA in 1974 and it limited contributions to
DC plans to the lesser of $25,000 or 25 percent of compensation.  The dollar limitations were adjusted for
inflation and by 1982 had risen to $45,472.  Effective in 1983, federal law was amended and reduced the
contribution limit to $30,000.  Although this new limit was supposed to have been adjusted for inflation, law
passed in 1984 froze the adjustments through 1988.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 governs current policy.  Contributions for and by an employee to all DC
plans maintained by an employer may not exceed the lesser of $30,000 (or, if greater, one-quarter of the
benefit dollar limitation allowed for defined benefit (DB) plans), and 25 percent of the participant’s
compensation.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set the dollar limitation for DB plan benefits at $120,000 and no5
inflation adjustments occurred until 1997.  The law provides that any inflation adjustment that is not a multiple
of $5,000 should be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $5,000.  Hence, even though the DB limit in 2000
had reached $135,000, the dollar limit for DC plans in 2000 still remains at $30,000.  The DC limit will
increase to $35,000 in 2001 as the DB limit increases to $140,000.
Chart 1 shows contribution limits to DC plans since 1982 in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms.
Since 1983, inflation has eroded the contribution limit, in July 1983 dollars, from $30,000 to about $17,500 in
2000.  Stated another way, if the $30,000 limit of 1983 had been allowed to keep pace with inflation, it would
be almost $52,000 in 2000; if the $45,472 limit in existence in 1982 had been allowed to keep pace with
inflation, it would be almost $79,000 in 2000.  Effectively, contribution limits to DC plans have been
progressively tightened for the last two decades.
In addition to the overall joint employer-employee limit on contributions of the lesser of $30,000 or 25
percent of salary, there are separate limits on employee contributions. Employee pretax (“elective”)
contributions are limited to $10,500 in 2000 for 401(k) and 403(b) plans and are coordinated with elective
contributions to SEPs, sec. 457 state and local government plans, tax-deferred 403(b) annuities, and
sec. 501(c)(18) trusts.
3  The elective contribution limit is adjusted for inflation in $500 increments.  Employer
contributions, whether basic or matching contributions, are limited to the overall limit less the employee
contribution limit.
Contributions may also be further restricted by nondiscrimination rules (sections 401(a) 4, 401(k) and
401(m)), whereby a DC pension plan, in the actual experience of the plan, generally cannot have higher paid
workers receiving higher contribution rates than lower paid workers.  Furthermore, an employer is limited with
respect to making tax-deductible contributions to a DC plan to 15 percent of the aggregate compensation of the
employees covered by the plan.  403(b) plans are subject to an additional contribution limit, known as the
“maximum exclusion allowance” or “MEA”.  It applies to both employer and employee contributions and
                                                
3 A special catch-up election under 403(b) plans applies to employees of educational organizations, home health service
agencies, health and welfare service agencies, and church organizations.  It applies only to employees with 15 or more
years of service and may increase the Section 402(g) limit by $3,000 in any given year.  The total of such additional
elective deferrals can never exceed $15,000 over the employee’s lifetime.  We did not consider this special catch-up
elective deferral for purposes of this paper.6
generally limits contributions to 20 percent of an employee’s compensation multiplied by the number of years
of service with the employer less prior amounts contributed to a retirement plan.
The maximum total annual new contribution permitted to IRAs (including traditional deductible IRAs,
Roth IRAs, and nondeductible IRAs) is the lesser of $2,000 or 100% of the individual’s compensation.
Starting in 1997, the limit for married couples was gradually increased to $4,000 ($2,000 per spouse).  The
maximum IRA contribution limit has been set at $2,000 since 1981.  An individual may make deductible
contributions to an IRA if neither the individual nor the individual’s spouse is an active participant in an
employer-sponsored pension plan.  If the individual or the spouse is an active participant in a pension plan, the
$2,000 deduction limit is phased-out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above $42,000 and for
married taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above $62,000.
As part of the “Taxpayer Relief Act of 2000,” which was passed by the House of Representatives in
October 2000, a substantial overhaul of the tax rules governing retirement plans was contemplated.  These
pension provisions were the result of several years of discussions and the introduction of various bills
containing pension reform provisions.  The Act was approved overwhelmingly by the House of
Representatives, but dropped by the Senate in response to a threatened Presidential veto.
The Act would have raised the dollar limit for DC plans to $40,000, subject to indexing in future years
in $1000 increments.  The limitation on elective contributions to 401(k), 403(b), and 457 plans would have
been raised to $15,000 over five years, subject to indexing thereafter in $500 increments.  And the annual
contribution limit for IRAs would have been raised over three years to $5,000 and thereafter subject to
indexing in $500 increments.  The Act would also have increased from 25 to 100 percent the percentage of
earnings limit on DC contributions and repealed the 403(b) MEA calculation.
Finally, the Act would have permitted workers age 50 and older to make additional annual “catch-up”
contributions to DC plans of up to $5,000 (phased in over five years), subject to indexing in $500 increments.
These additional contributions would not be subject to any other contribution limit, but would be subject to
non-discrimination tests.
In considering the DC limits, it’s important to bear in mind that the effective limits workers face are
determined by employer decisions, as well as by statute.  Employers who offer no DC plan are, in effect,7
setting their workers’ DC contribution limits to zero, and leaving their workers only the option of saving
through IRAs, with their very low contribution limits.  At any point in time, about half of the workforce has
access to neither DC or DB (defined benefit) plans.  As Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1999) document, recent
growth in DC plans has raised to about 40 percent the share of the U.S. workforce covered by such plans.
Nearly three-quarters of workers with 401(k)-type plans reported that they considered that plan as their
primary retirement plan.  At least a fifth of all participants in 401(k)-type plans in 1993 were enrolled in plans
with no employer contributions, and about 35 percent of workers at firms sponsoring these plans either could
not or did not participate.
Those employers who offer a DC plan with an employer match on employee contributions up to, say,
5 percent of pay are, perhaps unwittingly, suggesting that their workers contribute no more than
5 percent of their salary.  In 1997, the modal employer match was 50 percent on employee contributions up to
6 percent of pay.
4 The average employee elective contribution to these plans was 7.1 percent of compensation.
5
The maximum pretax employee contribution allowed by employers in saving and thrift plans in 1997
averaged 13.7 percent; the maximum contribution rate allowed by employers ranged from 5 percent or less to
20 percent, with the mode at 15 percent.
6  Apparently many plan sponsors are influenced by their workers’
preferences as well as by the operation of non-discrimination requirements and other legal factors in setting
maximum allowable contribution rates.
Why don’t workers in DC plans contribute to the maximum extent possible? The reasons given by
401(k) participants in the 1996 Retirement Confidence Survey are: cannot afford to save, too young to start
saving for retirement, saving for a house, saving for children’s college education, and difficult to withdraw
funds.
7  This survey also generated the following distribution of principal factors cited for determining 401(k)
contributions: the maximum amount employer would match (21 percent), the most one could afford to
contribute (31 percent), the maximum amount one is allowed to contribute (30 percent), the amount
participants determined they should contribute (16 percent), and other (2 percent).
                                                
4  See BLS (1999), table 152.
5 See EBRI (1997), Chapter 12.
6 See BLS (1999), table 150.
7  EBRI (1997), Chapter 13.8
III.   ESPlanner
The decision of when and how much to contribute to a DC plan involves a complex set of economic
factors.  First, workers have to consider their current federal plus state income-tax brackets to assess their
immediate tax saving from making DC contributions.  Second, workers have to project their future federal plus
state income-tax brackets to assess the rate at which their future DC withdrawals will be taxed.  For some
households, contributing to DC plans smoothes the time-path of taxable income and lowers the levels of
marginal tax rates they face, on average, as they age.
A third factor is the worker’s scope to contribute without reducing current consumption.  If workers
could borrow as much as they’d like they’d be in a position to perfectly smooth their consumption regardless
of how much they contributed to a DC plan.  In contrast, workers that are borrowing constrained will have to
lower their consumption when young in order to finance their DC contributions.
8  Whether a worker faces
borrowing constraints depends on his or her household’s projected growth in future income and its “off-the-
top” expenditures on housing and college and other special expenditures.
A fourth factor influencing the rate of DC subsidization is Social Security, specifically its progressive
provision of benefits and regressive taxation of payroll.  As documented in Gokhale, et. al. (1998), the Social
Security system represents a lifetime net benefit to the very poor, but a lifetime net tax to low income, middle
income, and high income households, with the rate of lifetime net taxation highest for those with middle
incomes.  In addition to affecting the level of consumable lifetime resources differentially for different
households, Social Security differentially affects the degree to which different households are liquidity
constrained.  This arises, in part, because Social Security’s benefit replacement rate is higher for low
contributors and, in part, because the program’s payroll tax ceiling makes payroll tax contributions a smaller
share of earnings the higher are earnings above the ceiling.
                                                
8 This will alter their entire time path of non-tax-favored asset accumulation, which, in turn, will mean a different time
path of income taxes than would otherwise have been the case.  It also leaves workers ending up in retirement with a
higher living standard than they enjoy when young.  For such workers, participation in DC plans, rather than smoothing
marginal tax rates, may do the opposite because it leaves them with so much more taxable income in old age than would
otherwise have been the case.9
Because the amount of consumption that can be financed out of earnings depends upon Social
Security’s net lifetime taxation and because the denominator in the DC tax-benefit rate is the household’s level
of consumption, the DC benefit rate will also be influenced by Social Security.  In raising the lifetime
consumption of the very poor, Social Security lowers their DC benefit rate.   It does the opposite for those with
higher incomes, especially for those who are in the middle class.
Taking into account the above-mentioned factors requires a life-cycle model that incorporates the fine
details of federal and state income taxation and Social Security taxes and benefits.  It also requires a model that
considers housing and special expenditures and recognizes household borrowing constraints.
9  ESPlanner
meets these requirements.  Developed by Economic Security Planning, Inc., ESPlanner smoothes a
household’s living standard over its life cycle to the extent permitted by its capacity to borrow.  As described
in the Appendix, the program has highly precise federal and state income tax calculators and Social Security
tax and benefit calculators.  The income tax calculators determine whether households should itemize their
deductions and place them in their appropriate tax brackets.  They also properly deduct DC contributions and
include DC withdrawals in determining taxable income.
10  The program also takes into account a variety of
additional factors involved in life-cycle consumption planning, including the non-fungible nature of housing,
bequest plans, and the desire of households to make special “off-the-top” expenditures on college tuition, etc.
Finally, ESPlanner recognizes that a household’s expenditures do not directly translate into its standard of
living.  Adjustments are made for household composition and household “economies of scale” -- the fact that
people can live more cheaply together than apart.
11  To be more precise, ESPlanner has a household provide
for children until they reach age 19, and considers that children may cost more or less than adults and that the
                                                
9 “Borrowing constrained” refers to a household’s inability to get credit on the security of its future anticipated earnings,
for example, through a credit card or an unsecured line of credit.  “Liquidity constrained” often refers to that as well as to
the inability to sell assets (whether financial or real) to finance consumption.  The former term is more appropriate for the
experiments considered in this paper.
10 See Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Warshawsky (2001, forthcoming) for a comparison of ESPlanner to more conventional
retirement planning software.
11 From the perspective of economic theory, the household is viewed as maximizing a Leontief intertemporal utility
function with year-specific time preference and demographic weights subject to borrowing constraints and non-negativity
constraints on life insurance.10
relative costs of children can vary by age.  It also adjusts for the number of adult equivalents based on a user-
specified degree of economies to scale in shared living.
ESPlanner’s principal outputs are recommended time-paths of consumption expenditure, taxable
saving, and term-life insurance holdings (for each spouse in the case of married households).  All outputs are
displayed in current-year dollars.  Consumption in this context is everything the household gets to spend after
paying for its “off-the-top” expenditures – its housing expenses, special expenditures, life insurance premiums,
taxes, and net contributions to tax-favored accounts.  As mentioned, the amount of recommended consumption
expenditures varies from year to year in response to changes in the household’s composition.  It also rises
when the household moves from a situation of being borrowing constrained to one of being unconstrained.
Finally, recommended household consumption will change over time if users intentionally specify that they
want their living standard to change.  For example, if users specify that they desire a 10 percent higher living
standard after a certain year in the future, the software will incorporate that preference in making its
recommendations, provided that it does not violate a borrowing constraint.
ESPlanner’s recommended taxable saving in a particular year equals the household’s total income
(non-asset plus asset income) in that year minus that year’s sum of (a) recommended spending on consumption
and insurance premiums, (b) specified spending on housing and special expenditures, (c) taxes, and (d) net
contributions to tax-favored accounts (contributions less withdrawals).  Given the household’s data inputs,
preferences, and borrowing constraints, ESPlanner recommends the highest and smoothest possible living
standard over time, leaving the household with zero terminal assets.
12
Our strategy is to use ESPlanner to determine how much households should save in the absence of DC
plans and then compare this recommended saving with the DC contribution limit.  ESPlanner’s recommended
saving includes saving for education, saving for retirement, and saving to smooth the household’s living
standard prior to retirement.  As indicated, ESPlanner considers a variety of key factors that influence actual
                                                
12 ESPlanner’s recommendations for annual term insurance are either positive or zero. If recommended term insurance is
positive for a particular potential decedent (the household head or, if married, spouse) in a particular year and if the
decedent dies at the end of that year, the surviving household will have precisely the same living standard as the household
would have had absent the decedent’s premature death.  If the potential decedent’s recommended insurance in a particular
year is zero, the surviving household will have the same or higher living standard if the decedent dies in that year.11
saving decisions, but not all factors.  The principal factor it ignores is uncertainty in earnings and rates of
return. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) is but one of a number of theoretical and simulation studies that
show that earnings uncertainty can raise desired saving rates.  Clearly then, optimal overall saving will be
larger than saving recommended by ESPlanner.
IV. Are Statutory Limits on Contributions to Defined Contribution Plans Binding?
Table 1 begins our evaluation of DC limits.  It does so for a Massachusetts household that has no
Social Security benefits, no children, no life-cycle earnings growth, no housing, and no DB plan or DC
account.  It also assumes that the household’s total earnings, which range in the table from $25,000 to $1
million per year, are equally divided between spouses, that each spouse works to age 65, that each spouse’s
maximum age of life is 95, that the household has no assets at the age the household is being considered, and
that the household earns a 4 percent real return on its savings.  The household has no access to any non-secured
borrowing, such as credit card debt.  The household’s desired standard of living remains flat over the life
cycle; this assumption is conservative for purposes of public policy analysis because it does not demand that
the government help finance through tax benefits for retirement savings a continually rising standard of living.
We start with this highly unrealistic household to a) illustrate how ESPlanner works and b) make the
strongest case that the statutory limits generally bind.  That is, households with Social Security benefits,
children, life-cycle earnings growth, and a mortgage to pay down will naturally save less when young.
In Table 1 and subsequent tables we consider two definitions of the household saving rate.  The first is
the “total” rate, by which we refer to total saving, including capital income, divided by total income, including
capital income.  The second is the “out-of-pocket” saving rate, which refers to total saving excluding capital
income divided by total income, excluding capital income.  The denominator in the out-of-pocket saving rate is
simply current labor earnings, thus making it directly comparable to the 25 percent DC limit, which is also
expressed relative to labor earnings.  Table 1 considers households at various initial ages when they are
assumed to have no assets. Therefore, they have no initial capital income and total and out-of-pocket saving
rates are identical at these initial ages.12
In this paper, we are somewhat informal in our characterization of poor, middle-income, upper-
income, and so on because we are examining stylized households.  One more formal frame of reference could
come ERISA itself; federal law, for purposes of non-discrimination requirements applying to pension plans,
defines the dividing line between highly compensated and non-highly-compensated workers to be (in 2001)
$85,000.  This, of course, is for a single worker, not a household.  Hence, we might characterize two-earner
households with incomes of $150,000 or less as non-highly-compensated, or not upper-income.
Table 1 delivers a number of messages.  First, absent Social Security and with the other
aforementioned factors, smoothing consumption requires a very high rate of saving.   A middle-income
($50,000 a year) couple needs to save 20.4 percent of its income at age 25.  If it fails to save and arrives at age
35 with no assets, it needs to save 27.0 percent of its income at that age.   The corresponding saving rates at
ages 45 and 55 are 36.6 percent and 52.0 percent.  Clearly, the 25 percent of earnings statutory DC joint
employer-employee contribution limit would bind for this household at ages 35, 45, and 55.
13  This is the
table’s second message – DC joint contribution limits are more likely to bind for older households who have
engaged in little or no past saving.  Indeed, the DC limits bind for all earnings classes at ages 35, 45, and 55,
but only for the two highest earning households at age 25.  A third point is that appropriate life-cycle saving
rates can vary considerably across households with different levels of earnings, particularly at older ages.  The
reason is the progressivity of income taxes, specifically the fact that higher earning households face relatively
higher income taxes during their working years compared to their old age.  This is particularly true of high
earnings households who begin to accumulate wealth late in life.
Table 2 considers the same type of households, but now assumes that the households properly save for
their retirement as they age, so that when we consider them, they hold assets equal to the accumulated amounts
should have saved in the past.  As a comparison with Table 1 indicates, this makes a huge difference to the rate
at which the households need to save late in life.  For example, households at 55 who earn $25,000 per year
                                                
13 The fact that this saving would be done in tax-favored form wouldn’t change this statement.  The tax benefits would
raise recommended consumption when young and old, but also lower taxes when young and raise them when old.  The net
impact would be more disposable income when young.  Hence, if the household can save x percent when young in non
tax-favored form without being liquidity constrained, it can save an even higher percent in tax-favored form when young
without being constrained.13
need to save only 30.9 percent of their wages, if they have saved in the past, compared to 54.5 percent if they
haven’t.
Proper saving over the life cycle dramatically reduces the potential for hitting the DC contribution
limit.  Table 3 shows the out-of-pocket saving rates that correspond to the total saving rates in Table 2; these
are the rates directly relevant to the evaluation of contribution limits.  The statutory DC joint employee-
employer contribution limit now binds in none of the cells, except at age 25 for the household earning
$300,000 per year and at ages 25, 35, and 45 for the household earning $1 million per year.  The limit on
employee elective contributions would, however, constrain optimal contributions at earlier ages among the
middle income as well as the upper income groups in the case of workers whose employers contribute little or
nothing on their behalf.
The comparison of Tables 2 and 3 indicates how much of a household’s required life-cycle saving can
be achieved in middle age by simply saving the capital income one earns on past saving.  Compare, for
example, the 23.1 percent total saving rate recommended in Table 2 for a 55 year-old household earning
$150,000 with the corresponding 0.3 percent out-of-pocket rate in Table 3.  For this household, there is almost
no need to actively save out of earnings at this age to smooth its future living standard.  All the household
needs to do is reinvest its capital income.  For households with even higher earnings, the recommended out-of-
pocket saving rates are slightly negative.  The clear message of Table 3 is that for the types of households we
are examining who do their homework and save early in life, the DC limits will not bind unless the household
has unusually high labor earnings when young or has an employer that makes little or no contributions on the
workers’ behalf.
Table 4 turns to a more realistic set of households.  In the new set of households the real earnings of
both the husband and wife grow by 1 percent per year each year prior to retirement.  The households own their
homes, have two children, and pay Social Security taxes and receive Social Security benefits.  The first child is
born when the couple is age 25, and the second when the couple is age 30.  The market value of a couple’s
house is set at three times annual labor earnings as of age 25.  The couple is assumed to purchase its house at
age 25, to borrow at 8 percent, put 20 percent down, and to take out a 30-year mortgage.  Annual homeowner’s
insurance, property taxes, and maintenance are set at .17 percent, 1 percent, and 1 percent of house value,14
respectively.  Each child is assumed to attend college for four years.  A couple earning $25,000 per year is
assumed to spend $7,500 per child for each year of college.  This college expense is set at $15,000 for couples
earning $50,000 and $30,000 for couples earning $100,000 or $150,000.  For couples earning $200,000 or
more per year, annual college expenses are capped at $35,000.  Non-secured borrowing is constrained to zero,
as in the simple cases above.  Also as in the prior tables, we continue to assume that the household does not
participate in a defined contribution plan.
Table 4 has four panels that differ with respect to the ages at which the household begins saving.  For
example, panel 4c assumes the household begins saving at age 45 and, therefore, had no accumulated savings
as of age 45.  Each panel shows the total and out-of-pocket saving rates at the age when the household begins
to save and at subsequent ages.  Consider first panel 4a, which examines the household at age 25.  The table
shows zero recommended saving at age 25, negative recommended saving at age 30, low recommended saving
at age 35, modest recommended saving at age 40, negative recommended saving at ages 45 and 50 (except for
the top earning households) and high recommended saving at ages 55 and 60.  What’s going on here? The
answer is that the household is borrowing constrained when it starts out and then does some small saving prior
to the arrival of the second child.  These savings are spent down when the second child arrives.  Between ages
25 and 40 the household is spending much of its resources paying down its mortgage.  Once the real value of
these mortgage payments is lowered by the assumed annual 3 percent inflation, the household begins to save
for its children’s college education.  At ages 45 and 50 the children are in college, and we see the household
dissaving as it meets tuition payments.  Once the children have completed college the household can begin
saving in earnest for retirement.  Consider the $50,000 per year household: its recommended out-of-pocket
saving rates at age 55 and age 60 are both a substantial 19.4 percent.
This recommended life-cycle saving pattern may seem surprising, but it corresponds to what one
observes empirically.  As shown in Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996),
and Carroll and Summers (1991), longitudinal age-consumption and age-earnings profiles track each other
very closely before late middle age, so that the hump saving that does occur, occurs only in the 15 or so years
before retirement.15
In panel 4a we indicate with an asterisk cells in which the households would not be able to do all of its
recommended saving via a defined contribution plan, assuming the plan permitted the maximum allowable
combined employer-employee contribution.  As shown, the constraints only bind for the top two earning
households, and only in middle and late middle age.  We indicate with italics cells in which the households
would not be able to do all of their recommended saving if their employers made no contributions to their
plans and they were limited by the elective (individual) contribution limit.  The elective contribution limit also
binds only at older ages, but across a wider range of earnings.
In addition to the interesting pattern of recommended saving rates by age, panel 4a shows remarkable
variation at a given age across households with different levels of earnings.  At age 55, the $25,000-a-year
earning household needs to save 15.6 percent of its income to smooth its future living standard.  In contrast,
the $150,000-a-year earning household needs to save 24.3 percent of its income.  What explains the
difference? The answer, for the most part, is Social Security, which replaces a much larger share of the lower
income household’s earnings.
Panel 4b repeats the exercise, but considers the household at age 35 under the assumption that the
household failed to save in the past.  The sign pattern of recommended saving rates from age 35 onward is
similar to that in panel 4a, but the magnitudes of recommended saving rates are somewhat different.  For
example, in panel 4a, the recommended out-of-pocket saving rate for the $50,000-a-year earning household at
age 40 is 4.8 percent compared with 5.8 percent in panel 4b.  If the households wait even later, until age 45 to
start saving, the saving rates are quite different, as shown in panel 4c.  Now the recommended age-45 saving
rates are zero, except for the highest earning household.  The reason is that these households, because they
have no assets, need to spend every free dollar on college tuition and mortgage payments. That is, they are
borrowing constrained and do the best they can do, which in this case is to save nothing.  Once their children
are out of college, saving picks up, but at a generally lower rate than had the household started saving before
age 45.  Waiting until later in life to save doesn’t alter significantly the number of cells that violate the DC
limits.   16
Sensitivity Analysis
Although we believe the set of households we examined in Table 4 are closer to reality than the initial
cases we examined, they are still highly idealized.  They represent a remarkable degree of earnings stability
and equality over a long horizon.  In particular, the assumption of long and equal labor force participation at a
steadily growing wage by husband and wife, both implicitly having access to the opportunity to save through a
pension plan, is still an unusual occurrence.  Hence, we believe for policy analysis purposes, the sensitivity
analysis in Table 5 will be particularly relevant.
Table 5 makes alternative assumptions in recalculating out-of-pocket saving rates at ages 35, 45, and
55 assuming the households saved appropriately in the past.  The alternative assumptions include a 6 rather
than a 4 percent real return, extra initial assets equal to one year’s earnings at age 25, no second child,
maximum age of life of 100, 2 rather than 1 percent real growth in earnings, and retirement at age 60.  Other
alternative assumptions include no borrowing constraint, the decision by the wife to remain at home while the
children are young, and residence in Indiana rather than Massachusetts.  A final set of alternative assumptions
include a) a two-third-one-third, rather than a fifty-fifty, split of earnings between the husband and wife, b) the
husband earning all household income, and c) a desired 1 percent annual growth in the household’s standard of
living through age 65.
A quick glance through the three panels of Table 5 indicates that the variants of 2 percent growth in
wages, no borrowing constraint, and early retirement make the greatest difference to recommended saving
rates.  DC joint employee-employer contribution limits bind more frequently in these cases as well as those in
which one spouse accounts for most of the household’s earnings.  However, with the exception of the early
retirement scenario and the no-borrowing constraint cases in panel 5c, all the cells in which the joint
employee-employer contribution limit binds involve older, upper-income households.
With higher real wage growth, households are borrowing constrained for longer periods of time and
recommended saving at age 35 is zero.  At age 45, recommended dissaving rates are roughly half as large, in
absolute value, for the low and middle earning households than in the base case.  Because households
experiencing higher earnings growth are borrowing constrained for longer periods of time, their capacity to
save and their subsequent ability to dissave, when children enter college, are both diminished.  The absence of17
borrowing constraints leads the lowest five earning households to dissave at both ages 35 and 45.  These
households then choose to save at dramatically higher rates at age 55.  Indeed, households at every level of
earnings, who can borrow freely, are subject to the joint DC contribution limits at age 55. When there is no
borrowing constraint, the household borrows extensively early in the life cycle.  In order to repay these debts
and to fund retirement, it must increase its savings rate substantially when older.
Households that retire early have fewer years to prepare for retirement and longer retirements to
finance, which explains why they save at higher rates while working.  Although allocating most or all of a
household’s earnings to one spouse doesn’t change recommended saving rates very much, it does change the
dollar limit applied to the household’s total DC contribution.  With two earnings, the limit is $60,000, but with
only one earner, it is only $30,000.  This explains why more of the cells in Table 5 under these variants would
be bound by the contribution limits.
The other variants make relatively little difference to recommended saving rates. Consider, for
example, the case of no second child. Table 5(a) shows that saving rates at age 35 are lower for low-income
households, but higher for high income ones.  The elimination of future college costs increases a low-income
household’s sustainable consumption level by enough to make it borrowing constrained when young.   At
middle and upper income levels the opposite happens because college costs do not rise in proportion to
lifetime income.  With one less child, borrowing constraints no longer bind at age 35 because the increase in
sustainable consumption due to lower college expenses is less than the reduction in one child’s consumption
expenses when young.  Thus, middle- and upper-income households save more at age 35 compared to the base
case.  Table 5(b) shows that, at age 45, saving rates are higher (less negative) at all income levels because one
fewer child implies smaller current college expenses.  Table 5(c) shows that saving rates at age 55 are lower at
all income levels because, with one fewer child, more saving has been done earlier in life.
When the household desires a rising, rather than a flat, standard of living during their working years,
the out-of-pocket saving rate is higher in early years, lower in the middle years when children go to school, and
significantly higher for middle-income households in the years preceding retirement.  But these changes in
saving rates don’t change the conclusion that the DC joint limits aren’t binding except for older, upper-income
households.18
V.  The Impact of Participating in DC Plans on the Age-Consumption Profile
Because most of our households are borrowing constrained at young ages, participating at any level in
a DC plan comes at the price of suffering a decline in current relative to future living standards.  Tables 6 and 7
show that contributing even small percentages of wages to DC plans can have a large impact on relative
consumption when young and old.  Table 6’s calculations assume a 4 percent real return, while Table 7’s
assume a 7 percent real return.  Both tables focus on the household that earns $50,000 per year.
Consider first Table 6’s results for the Base Case with no contribution to a DC plan.  The first column
shows the Base Case with borrowing constraints; the second shows the Base Case with no borrowing
constraints.  In the absence of borrowing constraints, the household enjoys the same living standard each year,
but its consumption expenditure varies with the size of the household.  In the presence of borrowing
constraints, the profile of the household’s living standard is disjoint, although it is smoothed to the maximum
extent possible.  The first two columns of Table 6 show that consumption is 17 percent lower at age 25, and 25
percent higher in the final year when the borrowing constraint in imposed than when it is not.
Consider next how a 10 percent contribution to a DC plan affects these results at age 25.
Consumption at age 25 under the borrowing constraint is one third less than it would be with no borrowing
constraints.  At the end of the household’s life, it is a remarkable 71 percent greater.  Stated differently, with
the 10 percent contribution and in the presence of borrowing constraints, consumption expenditures at the end
of life are more than twice as large as they are at the beginning.  In contrast, when the household is not
borrowing constrained, it consumes 18 percent less when old than when age 25.
These results are magnified if the DC contribution rate is 25, rather than 10, percent of earnings.  Now
in the borrowing constrained case, consumption when old is almost 5 times its level when young.  Next
consider what happens (in Table 7) if the borrowing-constrained household earns 7 percent rather than 4
percent real on both their non-DC and DC assets.  In this case, consumption when old is almost 4 times its
value when age 25 when the contribution rate is 10 percent.  If the contribution rate is 25 percent, consumption
when young is half of what it would be were the household not borrowing constrained, and consumption when
old is almost 10 times as high as the amount spent when young!  The most telling comparison here is between19
the levels of consumption at age 25 in this case, in which contributions are set at the legal maximum, and in
the base case, in which there are no DC contributions.  Consumption in this case is roughly one third less than
in the base case.  Hence, in order to contribute up to the statutory ceiling, the household would have to be
willing to lower its immediate living standard by one third – a sacrifice that most young households would
appear to be unwilling to make.
VI.  The Size of the DC Tax Benefit
By comparing, for different rates of DC contributions, the levels of consumption in the non-borrowing
constrained cases in Tables 6 and 7 one can automatically see the tax advantage of participating in a DC plan.
Table 8 presents the DC benefit for different rates of return under the assumption that the real rates of return on
non-DC assets and DC assets are the same.  It captures the pure tax advantage to contributing to a DC plan.  To
examine the potential benefit afforded by DC plans, the calculations assume elective employee contributions
and employer matching contributions equal to the average of maximum contributions allowed across DC
plans. The household’s elective contribution is set at 13.5 percent of earnings and the employer-matching
contribution is set at 3 percent of earnings, bringing the total DC plan contribution to 16.5 percent of
earnings.
14
Table 8 shows that at a 4 percent return, the lifetime tax benefit from consistently participating in a
DC plan increases from 1.9 percent at household earnings of $25,000 to 3.5 percent at $100,000, and to 9.8
percent at $300,000.  The dollar limit on contributions reduces the subsidy to 7.7 percent at earnings of
$1,000,000.   At a 6 percent real return, the poor and low-income classes get a small tax break, while the high
income households continue to receive significant benefits.  At an even higher, 8 percent real return, poor and
low-income households actually lose from 1.5 to 1.9 percent of their lifetime consumption from participating
in a DC plan as the result of ending up in higher tax brackets in retirement.  Even those earning $100,000 a
year end up slightly worse off from participating.  In contrast, households with earnings of $1 million per year
                                                
14 At this contribution rate, the dollar contribution ceiling limits the household’s contribution to $60,000 at earnings
exceeding of $363,636.36.  In our actual use of ESPlanner to make these calculations we treat all contributions as made by
the employee so that when we run the same case without DC contributions, there is no difference in the gross income
earned by the workers.20
enjoy a tax benefit equal to 6.5 percent of their lifetime consumption.  Clearly, there are large gains and also a
few non-trivial losses to be had by contributing to DC plans.  The table also shows that the tax benefit to DC
plans is regressive.
VII.  Summary and Conclusion
Our central findings are four.  First, for households that engage in life-cycle saving and have Social
Security benefits, children, housing, and modest life-cycle earnings growth, joint employer-employee DC
contribution limits would bind only for those with very high levels of earnings.  However, the elective
employee contribution limit would bind across a wider range of earnings if employers were to make no DC
contributions on behalf of their employees.  Second, the DC limits will bind for middle-class as well as upper-
income households at older ages if these households fail to save when young, plan to retire early, are single
earners, are not borrowing constrained, or experience rapid real wage growth.  Third, given borrowing
constraints, participating in DC plans comes at the cost of reducing one’s consumption when young
dramatically compared to what one will consume when old.  For example, assuming a 10 percent contribution
rate and a 4 percent real return, our stylized household’s consumption in retirement is almost twice its value
when young.  Fourth, assuming moderate rates of return, all income classes benefit from participating in DC
plans, although the tax break as a percent of lifetime consumption is higher for those with high incomes.  At
these rates of return, the statutory limit on joint contributions is effective in lowering the subsidy rate to the
rich.  However, at much higher rates of return, participating in DC plans actually generates higher lifetime net
taxes for low- and middle-income households because it pushes them into higher marginal tax brackets.
At most income levels and rates of return, tax breaks from DC plan-participation can be significant.
But the receipt of these tax breaks is only available to those fortunate enough to work for employers that offer
DC plans with high contribution rates. Taking advantage of the DC tax break, when it exists, requires not only
finding the right employer, but also, in many cases, being willing to forego some current consumption in order
to enjoy higher consumption in old age.  For the middle-income stylized household we considered here,
participating in a DC plan that sets contributions at the statutory limit and earns a 4 percent real return means
spending almost four times more on consumption when old than when young.21
ERISA doesn’t delineate principles for setting DC contribution limits.  It doesn’t say, for example,
that households with specific incomes should be able to save enough in tax-deferred form to finance fully their
retirements.  In focusing on benefit security, rather than saving adequacy, Congress appears to have set
ERISA’s contribution limits primarily based on equity and revenue considerations.
15  Had Congress instead
tried to establish lifetime, rather than annual, contribution limits to achieve a particular retirement saving
target, it would have had a difficult time.  As demonstrated here, the right target is critically dependent on a
range of household-specific demographic and economic factors.  In addition, regulating lifetime contribution
limits would be more difficult administratively than regulating annual ones.
If, in the context of our current income-tax structure, annual retirement account contribution limits
represents the only practical approach, what principles should guide the setting of these limits? We offer four.
The first is equal treatment of workers no matter their choice of employer.  This could be accomplished by
allowing workers to make IRA contributions equal to the difference between the DC statutory limits and the
maximum joint elective and employer contribution permitted by their DC plans.
16  If this first principle could
not be honored, a second, less ambitious one is equal treatment of all workers participating in DC plans,
regardless of their choice of employer.  This could be achieved by allowing workers to make elective
contributions equal to the difference between the DC statutory limits and the employer’s contribution on the
worker’s behalf.  A third principal would be that older workers need more scope to save for their retirement
than do younger ones.  This principle recognizes that many, if not most, households are liquidity constrained
when young and will be able to do significant retirement saving only in the fifteen or so years prior to
retirement.  A fourth principle is that the tax breaks afforded to DC participants not be viewed in isolation, but
rather set against the advantages certain households obtain from Social Security, Medicare, and other
government tax-transfer programs.   Meeting all four principles in establishing public policy requires a careful
balancing of equity and administrative concerns.
                                                
15 This criterion for setting limits can be contrasted with state-sponsored Section 529 tuition savings plans.  There the law
is explicit that the policy goal is to enable families to pay for five years of tuition and other educational expenses at the
most expensive college included in the plan, and that the state sponsor is to set lifetime contribution limits to allow the
achievement of that goal (see Ma, et. al., 2000).
16 Thus, workers with no DC plan would be able to contribute this year the lesser of 25 percent of their earnings or $30,000
to an IRA.22
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Total as Well as Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with No Initial Assets
 (Married Couple with No Children, No Social Security Benefits, No Earnings Growth, and No Housing)
           Age
Earnings 25 35 45 55 Maximum DC
Contribution Rate
$25,000 19.4 26.7 37.0 54.5 25.0
$50,000 20.3 27.0 36.6 52.0 25.0
$100,000 20.4 26.3 34.6 48.1 25.0
$150,000 20.8 26.2 33.7 46.1 25.0
$200,000 20.7 29.0 35.8 46.7 25.0
$250,000 20.5 25.4 32.4 43.5 24.0
$300,000 20.3 27.9 34.3 44.4 20.0
$1,000,000 19.3 23.8 29.8 39.2 6.0
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.  The out-of-pocket saving rate is
defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor earnings.
Table 2
Total Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with Life-Cycle Assets
(Married Couple with No Children, No Social Security Benefits, No Earnings Growth, and No Housing)
       Age
Earnings 25 35 45 55
$25,000 19.4 23.2 27.1 30.9
$50,000 20.3 24.1 26.3 27.7
$100,000 20.4 22.3 23.8 24.9
$150,000 20.8 22.3 22.9 23.1
$200,000 20.7 21.2 21.7 22.0
$250,000 20.5 21.1 21.4 21.4
$300,000 20.3 20.6 20.8 21.0
$1,000,000 19.3 19.8 20.1 20.3
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.25
Table 3
Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with Life-Cycle Assets
(Married Couple with No Children, No Social Security Benefits, No Earnings Growth, and No Housing)
       Age
Earnings 25 35 45 55 Maximum DC
Contribution Rate
$25,000 19.4 16.6 12.9 7.8 25.0
$50,000 20.3 17.3 11.5 3.7 25.0
$100,000 20.4 15.6 9.6 2.0 25.0
$150,000 20.8 15.5 8.9 .3 25.0
$200,000 20.7 14.6 7.7 0.0 25.0
$250,000 20.5 14.5 7.4 -.4 24.0
$300,000 20.3 14.1 7.2 -.5 20.0
$1,000,000 19.3 13.5 6.9 -.4 6.0
The out-of-pocket saving rate is defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor
earnings.26
Table 4
Total as Well as Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with No Initial Assets at Age
when Saving Begins
(Married Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and a House)
a) Saving begins at age 25




Savings 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Total 0 -3.1 .1 6.1 -8.9 -2.9 15.6 20.0
$25,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -3.1 .1 5.6 -10.0 -3.1 15.0 16.9
Total 0 -2.8 .2 5.2 -8.7 -3.1 20.2 23.2
$50,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -3.0 .2 4.8 -9.7 -3.3 19.4 19.4
Total 0 -2.7 1.5 5.5 -10.1 -3.2 21.8 24.6
$100,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -2.9 1.5 4.9 -11.4 -3.5 20.9 20.5
Total 0 -2.4 0 2.5 -4.4 -.2 24.3 26.3
$150,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -2.6 0 2.4 -4.9 -.4 23.2 21.6
Total 0 -2.8 0 1.9 -3.3 5.7 26.7 28.1
$200,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -3.0 0 1.8 -3.7 5.1 24.6* 22.2*
Total 0 -2.8 0 2.8 .4 9.5 27.3 28.4
$250,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -3.0 0 2.6 -.3 8.1 24.1* 21.4*
Total 0 -2.9 0 3.7 3.1 11.6 27.6 28.5
$300,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -3.0 0 3.4 2.1 9.5 23.7* 20.8*
Total 0 -1.2 3.3 6.9 12.0 19.2 28.5 29.2
$1,000,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -1.6 2.8 5.6* 9.4* 14.6* 21.7* 18.5*
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.  The out-of-pocket saving rate is
defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor earnings.
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total
contribution of $60,000.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to
make no contributions to the plan.27
Table 4 (continued)
Total as Well as Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with No Initial Assets at Age
when Saving Begins
(Married Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and a House)
b) Saving begins at age 35




Savings 35 40 45 50 55 60
Total 2.1 4.9 -11.6 -3.6 14.5 19.0
$25,000 Out-of-Pocket 2.1 4.1 -13.1 -3.9 14.3 16.2
Total .4 6.3 -10.4 -3.7 19.2 22.3
$50,000 Out-of-Pocket .4 5.8 -11.8 -4.0 18.7 18.7
Total 1.4 6.5 -11.5 -3.9 21.4 24.3
$100,000 Out-of-Pocket 1.4 5.9 -12.9 -4.3 20.7 20.3
Total 0 3.2 -5.5 -2.0 24.7 26.8
$150,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 3.1 -6.1 -2.2 23.8 22.3
Total 0 2.2 -4.1 2.4 27.4 29.1
$200,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 2.2 -4.5 2.0 25.9* 23.7*
Total 0 1.0 -2.2 6.9 28.6 29.7
$250,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 1.0 -2.4 6.2 26.4* 23.6*
Total 0 1.6 .6 9.4 28.8 29.8
$300,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 1.5 .1 8.2 25.9* 23.1*
Total .4 5.0 10.2 17.4 29.7 30.5
$1,000,000 Out-of-Pocket .4 4.6 8.6* 14.0* 24.3* 21.0*
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.  The out-of-pocket saving rate is
defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor earnings.
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total
contribution of $60,000.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to
make no contributions to the plan.28
Table 4 (continued)
Total as Well as Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with No Initial Assets at Age
when Saving Begins
(Married Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and a House)
c) Saving begins at age 45
        Age
Earnings at
Age 45 Type of Savings 45 50 55 60
Total 0 -4.6 6.3 9.9
$25,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -5.0 6.3 8.6
Total 0 -4.4 12.5 15.9
$50,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -4.8 12.5 13.6
Total 0 -4.6 19.7 22.6
$100,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -5.1 19.3 19.2
Total 0 -2.4 23.4 25.7
$150,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -2.6 22.7 21.6
Total 0 -1.9 27.6 29.3
$200,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 -2.0 26.8* 24.7
Total 0 2.6 28.9 30.5
$250,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 2.2 27.5* 25.2*
Total 0 5.5 29.6 30.9
$300,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 5.0 27.8* 25.2*
Total 7.3 14.9 31.4 32.3
$1,000,000 Out-of-Pocket 7.3* 13.2* 27.9* 24.6*
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.  The out-of-pocket saving rate is
defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor earnings.
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total
contribution of $60,000.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to
make no contributions to the plan.29
Table 4 (continued)
Total as Well as Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates by Age and Annual Earnings with No Initial Assets at Age
when Saving Begins
(Married Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and a House)
d) Saving begins at age 55
              Age
Earnings at
Age 55 Type of Savings 55 60
Total 0 0
$25,000 Out-of-Pocket 0 0
Total 9.2 13.1
$50,000 Out-of-Pocket 9.2 11.3
Total 19.8 22.8
$100,000 Out-of-Pocket 19.8 19.7
Total 24.4 26.8
$150,000 Out-of-Pocket 24.4 23.2
Total 28.8 30.3
$200,000 Out-of-Pocket 28.8* 26.4*
Total 30.9 32.3
$250,000 Out-of-Pocket 30.9* 28.2*
Total 32.1 33.2
$300,000 Out-of-Pocket 32.1* 29.0*
Total 35.4 36.4
$1,000,000 Out-of-Pocket 35.4* 32.0*
The total saving rate is defined as total saving divided by total income.  The out-of-pocket saving rate is
defined as a) total saving minus capital income divided by b) total labor earnings.
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total
contribution of $60,000.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to
make no contributions to the plan.30
Table 5(a)
Age-35 Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates for Variants on the Base Case (Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and Housing) with Age-
35 Life-Cycle Assets



























































$25,000 .1 0 -4.4 0 .2 0 0 -8.3 0 0 0 .1 1.7 25.0
$50,000 .2 0 -4.9 0 .2 0 .1 -5.8 0 0 .1 .3 1.4 25.0
$100,000 1.5 1.3 -4.6 .9 1.5 0 2.5 -2.8 0 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.0 25.0
$150,000 0 0 -5.3 0 0 0 1.1 -2.9 0 0 0 0 2.0 25.0
$200,000 0 0 -4.9 1.3 0 0 4.3 -.3 0 0 0 1.0 4.0 25.0
$250,000 0 0 -4.4 2.4 .6 0 4.7 .3 0 0 0 1.4 4.3 22.0
$300,000 0 0 -3.8 3.1 1.4 0 5.2 .7 0 0 0 1.7 4.7 18.1
$1,000,00
0
2.8 0- 1 . 8 5 . 9 * 4.0 07 . 1 *2.9 0 2.7 2.9 3.2* 6.3* 5.4
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total contribution of $60,000 or an annual contribution of $10,500 to a 401(k) per person.
† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for 2% Growth in Labor Income scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 24.6, 20, 16.4, and 5 for the respective earning categories.
‡ Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Wife at Home scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 20.0, and 10.8 for the respective earning categories.
** Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Earnings Split scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 21.9, 19.2, 17.4, and 5.4 for the respective earning categories.
†† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Husband earning all the income scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 18.1, 13.6, 10.9, 9.1, and 2.7 for the respective earning categories.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to make no contributions to the plan.31
Table 5(b)
Age-45 Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates for Variants on the Base Case (Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and Housing) with Age-45 Life-Cycle Assets



























































$25,000 -10.0 -10.3 -13.5 -8.5 -10.1 -4.6 -10.0 -14.4 -9.7 -9.9 -9.9 -10.1 -14.5 25.0
$50,000 -9.7 -9.9 -13.3 -8.6 -9.7 -5.6 -9.6 -13.3 -9.5 -9.4 -9.7 -9.9 -13.6 25.0
$100,000 -11.4 -11.6 -15.3 -9.7 -11.4 -5.9 -10.7 -13.0 -10.4 -11.1 -11.3 -11.2 -15.1 25.0
$150,000 -4.9 -5.0 -6.9 -3.7 -4.9 -1.9 -2.9 -5.3 -5.3 -4.6 -4.7 -4.6 -5.8 25.0
$200,000 -3.7 -3.8 -5.9 -.5 -3.0 -1.0 -.8 -2.4 -4.1 -3.5 -3.5 -1.9 -4.4 24.6
$250,000 -.3 -1.7 -2.9 2.9 .5 1.0 2.2 -.9 0 0 -.2 1.1 -1.2 20.0
$300,000 2.1 .2 -.8 5.1 2.8 3.0 4.1 2.7 1.7 2.3 2.1 3.0 .8 16.4
$1,000,00
0
9.4* 7.7* 6.0* 11.9* 9.8* 10.3* 10.9* 9.4* 9.7* 9.7* 9.4* 9.3* 7.9* 5.0
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total contribution of $60,000 or an annual contribution of $10,500 to a 401(k) per person.
† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for 2% Growth in Labor Income scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 20.2, 16.2, 13.5, and 4.0 for the respective earning categories.
‡ Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Wife at Home scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 21.2, 17.6, and 5.2 for the respective earning categories.
** Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Earnings Split scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 24.7, 20.6, 18.2, 16.4, and 5.0 for the respective earning categories.
†† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Husband earning all the income scenarios are 25, 25, 24.6, 16.4, 12.3, 9.8, 8.2, and 2.5 for the respective earning categories.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to make no contributions to the plan.32
Table 5(c)
Age-55 Out-of-Pocket Saving Rates for Variants on the Base Case (Couple with Two Children, Social Security Benefits, Increasing Earnings, and Housing) with Age-55 Life-Cycle Assets



























































$25,000 15.0 13.0 15.3 13.7 16.0 16.8 30.5* 31.6* 15.3 15.0 17.3 10.6 19.0 25.0
$50,000 19.4 17.3 19.6 17.1 20.5 19.4 31.5* 32.6* 20.6 19.9 19.6 16.1 22.8 25.0
$100,000 20.9 19.3 21.1 17.6 22.0 22.9 29.4* 29.1* 21.8 22.0 21.9 23.8* 23.5 25.0
$150,000 23.2 21.8 23.3 19.7 24.1 24.4* 27.7* 28.8* 24.2 23.9 24.6* 26.8* 23.3 25.0
$200,000 24.6* 22.5* 23.2* 19.6 25.1* 25.1* 25.1* 25.8* 24.9* 25.2* 24.7* 25.5* 20.7 22.3
$250,000 24.1* 22.6* 22.2* 19.2* 24.4* 25.0* 23.7* 24.7* 24.8* 24.7* 23.9* 24.5* 19.6* 18.0
$300,000 23.7* 22.1* 21.6* 19.3* 23.9* 24.9* 23.1* 24.2* 24.4* 24.3* 23.4* 23.8* 19.1* 14.8
$1,000,00
0
21.7* 19.7* 19.1* 18.0* 21.4* 24.2* 20.4* 21.7* 23.2* 22.4* 21.4* 21.1* 17.2* 4.4
* Desired saving would be restricted by a maximum DC contribution rate of 25% or combined total contribution of $60,000 or an annual contribution of $10,500 to a 401(k) per person.
† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for 2% Growth in Labor Income scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 22, 16.6, 13.2, 11.0, and 3.4 for the respective earning categories.
‡ Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Wife at Home scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 25, 23.9, 19.2, 15.9, and 4.8 for the respective earning categories.
** Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Earnings Split scenarios are 25, 25, 25, 23.2, 19.5, 17.2, 14.8, and 4.4 for the respective earning categories.
†† Maximum DC Contribution Rates for Husband earning all the income scenarios are 25, 25, 22.3, 14.8, 11.1, 8.9, 7.2, and 2.2 for the respective earning categories.
Italics Desired saving would be restricted by a elective contribution limit of $10,500 were the employer to make no contributions to the plan.33
Table 6
Life-Cycle Consumption Profiles for the Base-Case Household with $50,000 in Annual Earnings at Age 25 for Different Rates of Contribution to a DC Plan, Assuming 4 Percent Non Tax-Favored
and Tax-Favored Real Rates of Return
(2000 dollars)





























































25 26,511 32,020 24,514 33,130 22,518 33,906 20,529 34,624 18,538 34,956 16,546 34,932
35 33,566 37,437 31,289 38,735 28,958 39,642 26,631 40,482 24,317 40,871 22,002 40,842
45 28,709 32,020 26,761 33,130 24,767 33,906 22,777 34,624 20,798 34,956 18,818 34,932
55 32,619 26,124 39,364 27,030 42,540 27,663 40,013 28,249 37,352 28,520 34,688 28,500
65 32,619 26,124 39,364 27,030 47,434 27,663 58,192 28,249 68,140 28,520 78,089 28,500
75 32,619 26,124 39,364 27,030 47,434 27,663 58,192 28,249 68,140 28,520 78,089 28,500
85 32,619 26,124 39,364 27,030 47,434 27,663 58,192 28,249 68,140 28,520 78,089 28,500
95 32,619 26,124 39,364 27,030 47,434 27,663 58,192 28,249 68,140 28,520 78,089 28,50034
Table 7
Life-Cycle Consumption Profiles for the Base-Case Household with $50,000 in Annual Earnings at Age 25 for Different Rates of Contribution to a DC Plan, Assuming 7 Percent Non Tax-Favored
and Tax-Favored Real Rates of Return
(2000 dollars)





























































25 26,662 31,055 24,663 32,462 22,664 33,268 20,668 33,552 18,678 33,670 16,698 33,713
35 33,818 36,309 31,710 37,954 29,433 38,897 27,108 39,229 24,714 39,366 22,330 39,417
45 29,013 31,055 27,134 32,462 25,174 33,268 23,185 33,552 21,137 33,670 19,099 33,713
55 34,923 25,337 44,787 26,485 42,540 27,143 40,013 27,374 37,352 27,470 34,688 27,505
65 34,923 25,337 55,649 26,485 83,481 27,143 110,273 27,374 135,999 27,470 159,821 27,505
75 34,923 25,337 55,649 26,485 83,481 27,143 110,273 27,374 135,999 27,470 159,821 27,505
85 34,923 25,337 55,649 26,485 83,481 27,143 110,273 27,374 135,999 27,470 159,821 27,505
95 34,923 25,337 55,649 26,485 83,481 27,143 110,273 27,374 135,999 27,470 159,821 27,50535
Table 8
Tax Benefit for Base-Case Household from Participating in a DC Plan
(Measured as Percent of Lifetime Consumption at 16.5 percent contribution rate* for Alternative Rates of Return and Levels of Annual Earnings at Age 25)
Real Rate of Return on Tax-Favored and Non Tax-Favored Assets
Earnings at Age 25 2 % 4% 6% 8% 10%
$25,000 3.96 1.89 .59 -1.53 -3.26
$50,000 3.21 1.97 .11 -1.94 -3.88
$100,000 4.25 3.45 1.88 -.07 -1.47
$150,000 4.77 4.52 2.26 .29 -1.05
$200,000 7.66 6.63 4.11 2.02 .54
$250,000 10.35 8.83 5.71 3.66 2.19
$300,000 11.05 9.80 6.46 4.22 2.78
$1,000,000 7.19 7.67 7.21 6.48 4.31
Subsidy is calculated as the percentage difference in the present value of the household’s lifetime consumption, discounted at a the specified real rate of return (the assumed return on both tax-favored and non
tax-favored assets) to age 25.
*For $1,000,000 earnings, the 10% contribution rate was constrained to the limit of a $60,000 annual contribution.36
Appendix
ESPlanner’s Tax and Social Security Benefit Calculations
Federal Income Tax Calculations
ESPlanner’s calculations of federal income taxes in each future year take into account the household’s year-
specific marital status.  Thus, in the case of married households, the marital status is married when both
spouses are alive and single when on is deceased.  Households that are married are assumed to file jointly.  The
tax schedules for each filing status are taken from the federal income tax booklet for the latest available tax
year—usually the year prior to the “current” year entered by the user. The tax schedule is applied to the
program’s calculation of federal taxable income. Federal taxable income equals federal Adjusted Gross Income
(AGI) less personal exemptions and less the standard or itemized deduction, whichever is larger.
AGI for each year includes projected incomes in current dollars from the following sources: Labor income
(wages and salaries), self-employment income, asset income projected by the program based on user inputs of
initial non-tax-favored net worth and rates of return, and on the optimal spending plan computed by the
program.  AGI also includes taxable asset income, taxable social security benefits, taxable special receipts,
taxable distributions from defined benefit pension plans and taxable withdrawals from tax-favored saving
plans.  Each of these items is based upon the user’s inputs and preferences.  Non-taxable special receipts and
withdrawals from non-deductible tax-favored accounts are not included in AGI.  Deductible contributions to
tax-favored retirement accounts are subtracted from income in calculating each year’s AGI.  Employer
contributions to tax-favored retirement accounts are not included in AGI.  However, withdrawals from these
accounts are included.
The Tax Schedule
The tax schedules for the two types of filing statuses implemented in ESPlanner are taken from the federal
income tax booklet for the 1998 tax year—the latest year for which the federal schedules are available.  These
schedules are as follows:
(1) (2) (3)     (4)
If taxable                                                                    of the
income            but not            the tax                            amount
is over--           over--              is--                           over--
Married filing jointly:
        $ 0            $42,350         ----------     15   %                   $0
  42,350          102,300         $6,352.50 + 28   %          42,350
102,300          155,950    23,138.50 + 31   %        102,300
155,950          278,450 39,770.00 + 36   %       155,950
278,450          ----------   83,870.00 + 39.6%                278,450
Single:
        $ 0           $ 25,350           ----------  15   %                             $0
  25,350             61,400        $3,802.50 + 28   %                      25,350
  61,400          128,100          13,896.50 + 31   %                      61,400
128,100          278,450         34,573.50 + 36   %                         128,100
278,450            ----------          88,699.50 + 39.6%        278,450
The Indexation of the Tax Schedule
Tax-rate brackets and infra-marginal tax amounts (all of the dollar amounts listed in the tax schedules) are
adjusted for inflation in each year over the household’s lifetime.  This is done to ensure that the schedule keeps
pace with the growth of income in current dollars.  The indexation is done using the user-specified rate of
inflation.37
Adjustment for the current year
Because the tax schedules listed above are applicable for the 1998 tax year whereas the user will enter 1999 as
the current year, all tax brackets and infra-marginal tax amounts [the dollar amounts shown in column (3) in
the schedules listed above] are indexed for inflation at the user-specified annual rate. This is done to avoid
subjecting 1999 taxable income to tax schedules appropriate for 1998—that is, based on the wage and price
levels prevailing in 1998.
Standard Deductions and Exemptions
The standard deduction and personal exemption amounts are also taken from the tax year prior to the “current”
year (tax year 1998 in the current version). The amount subtracted from AGI for each personal exemption was
$2,700. The standard deductions were $7,100 for the “married filing jointly” filing status and $4,250 for the
“single” filing status.  These amounts are also indexed for inflation for each future year based on the user-
specified future rate of inflation. The number of personal exemptions allowed equals 2 plus the number of
children for “married and filing jointly” and 1 plus the number of children for the “single” filing statuses. The
personal exemption amount that can be deducted from AGI in calculating taxable income is phased out if AGI
is above certain dollar limits depending upon the filing status. ESPlanner takes account of the phase-out of
personal exemptions based on these dollar limits indexed for inflation.
The Decision to Itemize
ESPlanner takes the maximum of the standard deduction or itemized deduction where the latter includes
mortgage interest payments, property taxes, state and local income tax payments, and tax-deductible special
expenditures that the user specifies—such as alimony payments, charitable contributions, and deductible
medical expenses. Note that state and local income tax payments are deductible only if they are being withheld
from pay or the user makes estimated tax payments during the during the tax year. ESPlanner assumes
withholding or pre-payment in every case.
The Phase Out of Itemized Deductions
Federal income tax rules phase out itemized deductions for high income taxpayers (both, married filing jointly
and single payers).  For the 1998 tax year, the amount of the deduction is reduced by 3¢ for every dollar of
AGI in excess of $124,500 with the total reduction limited to 80 percent of the original amount.  The reduction
does not apply to certain components of the itemized deductions claimed—such as medical care expenses,
investment interest, and casualty and theft losses. Because ESPlanner does not distinguish between these and
other sources of itemized deductions, the phase-out rules are applied to the entire itemized deduction.
The Child Tax Credit
The child tax credit equals $400 times the number of qualifying children in the household.  The tax credit is
phased out if AGI is over the threshold of $110,000 for the “married and filing jointly” status and of $75,000
for the “single” filing status.  The phase-out rate is $50 for each $1000 of income in excess of the applicable
threshold.  The amount of the child tax credit equals the computed amount or the federal income tax liability
net of the earned income tax credit, whichever is less.  If the earned income tax credit exceeds the federal
income tax liability, the child tax credit is applied against the payroll tax liability.
The Earned Income Credit
The program’s calculation of the earned income credit adheres to the EIC worksheet in federal Form 1040.
ESPlanner first checks for eligibility to take EIC based on investment income and on taxable and non-taxable
(employer contributions to 401k plans, for example) earned income thresholds for households with no
qualifying child and those with at least one qualifying child (adopted, foster, step-and grand-children are
excluded in ESPlanner’s calculations).  Next, EIC is computed based on the EIC schedule for taxable and
nontaxable income.   If the EIC is non-zero, it applies if AGI is less than certain dollar thresholds ($5600 for
households without a qualifying child and $ 12,300 for households with at least 1 qualifying child). If AGI is
greater than these dollar amounts, EIC is based on the AGI.38
Payroll Taxes
In each year, the payroll tax for a married household is the sum of the two spouses’ payroll taxes.  Each
spouse’s tax equals the employee share of the OASDI tax rate (6.2 percent) applied to labor earnings up to the
taxable maximum level plus the employee share of the HI tax rate (1.45 percent) applied to total labor
earnings.  If earnings from self-employment are present, these are included in the calculation only to the extent
that labor earnings fall short of the taxable maximum limit for the OASDI tax.  The entire labor income from
self-employment in taxed on account of the HI tax.  In the case of self-employment income, the employer plus
employee tax rates for OASDI and HI are applied.
The Taxation of Social Security Benefits
Social Security benefits are taxed by including these benefits in the federal income tax base in the following
manner.  If the sum of AGI and 50 percent of Social Security benefits falls short of $25,000 (adjusted for
inflation for future years) if single and $32,000 (same qualifier) if married, then none of the benefits are
taxable.  If the sum exceeds the applicable dollar threshold, but the excess is less than $9,000 if single
($12,000 if married), then the smaller of one-half of the excess or 50 percent of the benefit is taxable and is
included in the federal income tax base.  In addition, if the aforementioned excess is greater than the dollar
thresholds, 85 percent of this excess or 85 percent of the benefit, whichever is smaller, is also added to the
federal income tax base.
State Income Tax Calculations
State income taxes are calculated for each state that imposes an income tax according to the specific tax rules
applicable in user’s state of residence. In most cases, the state income tax base equals the federal AGI re-
adjusted for taxable Social Security benefits. State income tax calculations incorporate special features peculiar
to each state: For example, some states (such as Massachusetts) impose special taxes on asset incomes.  State-
specific personal, spousal, and dependent exemptions (including additional exemptions for the elderly) and the
applicable standard deductions are used to calculate the state taxable income.  State taxes are calculated by
applying the state’s tax rate schedule to the taxable income.
Social Security Benefit Calculations
Retirement Benefits
Eligibility – Before ESPlanner provides you (and your spouse if married) Social Security retirement benefits, it
checks that you are fully insured. Individuals must be fully insured to receive retirement benefits based on their
earnings records. Becoming fully insured requires sufficient contributions at a job (including self-employment)
covered by Social Security. For those born after 1929, acquiring 40 credits prior to retirement suffices for
fully-insured status. Earnings between 1937 and 1951 are aggregated and divided by $400, and the result
(rounded down to an integer number) are the pre-1952 credits which are added to the credits earned after 1950
in determining insured status. After 1951, workers earn one credit for each quarter of the year they work in
Social Security-covered employment and earn above a specified minimum amount. The year of first eligibility
for retirement benefits is the year in which the individual becomes age 62. The individual is entitled to
retirement benefits after an application for benefits is submitted, but never before age 62.
Determination of Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) -- The PIA is the basis for all benefit payments made on a
worker’s earnings record. There are several steps in computing the PIA. Base years are computed as the years
after 1950 up to the first month of entitlement to retirement benefits begins. For survivor benefits, base years
include the year of the worker's death.
Elapsed years are computed as those years after 1950 (or after attainment of age 21, whichever occurs later) up
to (but not including) the year of first eligibility. The maximum number of elapsed years for an earnings record
is 40 (it could be shorter, for purposes of calculating survivor benefits if the person dies prior to age 62).
Computation years are calculated as the number of elapsed years less 5, or 2, whichever is greater. Earnings in
base years (up to the maximum taxable limit in each year, and through age 60 or two years prior to death,
whichever occurs earlier) are wage-indexed according to economy-wide average wages. Of these, the highest39
earnings in years equaling the number of computation years are added together and the sum is divided by the
number of months in computation years to yield Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).
Bend Points -- The AIME is converted into a PIA using a formula with bend points. The bend point formula is
specified as 90 percent of the first X dollars of AIME plus 32 percent of the next Y dollars of AIME plus 15
percent of the AIME in excess of Y dollars. The dollar amounts X and Y are also wage indexed and are
different for different eligibility years. The dollar amounts pertaining to the year of attaining age 60 (or, for
survivor benefits, the second year before death, whichever is earlier) are applied in computing the PIA.
Benefits- A person who begins to collect benefits at his or her "normal retirement age" (currently age 65)
receives the PIA as the monthly retirement benefit. In subsequent years, the monthly benefit is adjusted
according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to maintain its purchasing power.
Increases in Normal Retirement Ages -- After 2003 normal retirement ages are scheduled to increase by 2
months for every year that a person’s 65th birthday occurs later than the year 2003. This progressive increase
in the normal retirement age for those born later ceases between the years 2008 through 2020; those attaining
age 65 in these years have a normal retirement age of 66. The postponement in retirement ages resumes after
2020 such that those born after 2025 have a normal retirement age of 67. All cohorts attaining age 65 after that
year have a normal retirement age of 67.
Reductions for Age -- A person who begins to collect retirement benefits earlier than the normal retirement age
receives a reduction for age. The reduction factor is 5/9 of 1 percent for each month of entitlement prior to the
normal retirement age. The reduced benefit payment (except for the inflation adjustment) continues even after
the person reaches or surpasses the normal retirement age. If the number of months of reduction exceeds 36
months (for example, in case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal retirement age is 67), then the reduction
factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every additional month of early entitlement.
Delayed Retirement Credits--Those who begin to collect benefits after their normal retirement age (up to age
70) receive delayed retirement credits. The amount of the delayed retirement credit for each month of delayed
entitlement depends on the year in which a person attains normal retirement age. For example, those attaining
age 65 in 1997 receive an additional 5 percent in monthly benefits for each year of delay in entitlement.
However, those attaining age 65 in the year 2008 will receive an additional 8 percent in benefits for each year
of delayed entitlement.
Earnings Test -- If a person continues to work and earn after the month of entitlement, benefits are reduced
because of an earnings test. Beneficiaries under the normal retirement age, lose $1 for each $2 earned above an
earnings limit. Those older than the normal retirement age, lose $1 for each $3 earned above a higher earnings
limit. The earnings limits have already been specified through the year 2000 and are scheduled to grow with
average wages in subsequent years. All benefits payable on a worker’s earnings record, including the worker’s
own retirement benefits and spousal and child dependent benefits, are proportionally reduced by the testing of
the worker’s earnings.
Recomputation of Benefits -- Earnings in any year after entitlement to benefits are automatically taken into
account in a recomputation of the PIA for determining the subsequent year's benefit amount. However, these
earnings are not indexed before they are included in the AIME calculation. If such earnings are higher than
some prior year's earnings (indexed earnings through age 60 or unindexed earnings after age 60), they result in
an increase in the PIA and benefit payable. If they are lower than all previous year's earnings, they will not
lower the PIA or benefits since only the highest earnings in base years are included in the calculations.
Spousal and Child Dependent Benefits
Eligibility -- Wives and husbands of insured workers (including divorced spouses) are entitled to spousal
benefits if the couple was married for at least 10 years at the time of application for spousal benefits, the
spouse is over age 62 or has in care a child under age 16 entitled to benefits under the insured worker's record,40
and the insured worker is collecting retirement benefits. Children of insured workers under age 16 are entitled
to child dependent benefits if the child is unmarried and the worker is collecting retirement benefits.
Benefits -- Spousal and child benefits equal 50 percent of the insured worker's PIA (each). Child dependent
benefits may be lower only if the family maximum applies. Spousal benefits may be lower due to the family
maximum, a reduction for age, the application of the earnings test, or the spouse’s receipt of retirement
benefits based or her or his own earnings record.
Family Maximum -- All benefits paid under a worker's record (except retirement benefits or  divorced spousal
benefits) are reduced proportionately to bring them within the family maximum benefit level. The maximum
benefits payable on a worker's earnings record is determined by applying a bend point formula to the PIA
similar to that applied to the AIME in calculating the PIA. For example, the family maximum equals 150
percent of the first $X of PIA plus 272 percent of the next $Y of the PIA plus 134 percent of the next $Z of the
PIA plus 175 percent of the PIA greater than $X+$Y+$Z. The values X, Y, and Z are adjusted for each year of
the calculation according to the growth in economy-wide average wages. In case the spousal benefit is
eliminated for any reason, the benefits payable on the insured worker's  record are subjected to the family
maximum test again, treating the spouse as though he/she were not eligible for spousal benefits. This may
result in higher benefits for children who may be eligible for dependent benefits under the worker's record.
Reduction of Spousal Benefits for Age -- Spouses eligible for the spousal benefit may elect to receive (may
become entitled for) their benefits before normal retirement age. In this case the spousal benefit is reduced by
25/36 of 1 percent for each month of entitlement prior to normal retirement age. If the number of months of
reduction exceeds 36 months (for example, in case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal retirement age is
67), then the reduction factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every additional month of early entitlement.
Earnings Testing and Redefinition of Spousal Benefits -- If a spouse is earning above the amount allowed by
the earnings test, the spousal benefits he or she is eligible to receive will be earnings tested according to the
pre- and post-normal retirement schedule described above.  If a spouse is already collecting retirement
benefits, the spousal benefit is redefined as the greater of the excess of the spousal benefit over the spouse's
own retirement benefit or zero.
Survivor Benefits (Widow(er), Father/Mother, and Children)
Eligibility-- The surviving spouse of a deceased worker is eligible for widow(er) benefits if the widow(er) is at
least age 60, is entitled (has applied for widow[er] benefits), the worker died fully insured, and the widow(er)
was married to the deceased worker for at least 9 months. The widow(er) of a deceased worker is eligible for
father/mother benefits if the widow(er) is entitled to benefits (has applied), the worker died fully insured, the
widower has in care a child of the worker. A surviving child is eligible for child survivor benefits on the
deceased worker's record if the child is under age 18 and is entitled (an application has been filed) and the
worker was fully insured.
Survivor Benefits-- Monthly benefits equal 100 percent of the worker's PIA for a widow(er); they equal 75
percent of the PIA for father/mother and child survivor benefits. Widow(er) and child survivor benefits may be
lower only if the family maximum applies. Widow(er)s may become entitled to (elect to receive) survivor
benefits earlier than normal retirement age, but not earlier than age 60. In this case the reduction is 19/40 of 1
percent for each month of entitlement prior to normal retirement age. After the widow(er) is 62, he or she is
may become entitled to (elect to receive) retirement benefits based on her own past covered earnings record. In
this case the widow(er) benefits are redefined as the excess over own retirement benefit or zero, whichever is
greater. Finally, widow(er) survivor and own retirement benefits are also subject to the earnings test. If the
deceased worker was already collecting a reduced retirement insurance benefit, the widow(er)'s benefit cannot
be greater than the reduced widow(er) benefit or the greater of 82.5 percent of the worker's PIA or the worker's
own retirement benefit. If the deceased worker was already collecting a retirement insurance benefit greater
than the PIA because of delayed retirement, the widow(er) or is granted the full dollar amount of the delayed41
retirement credit over and above the (reduced) widow(er) benefit. Father/mother benefits are not similarly
augmented by delayed retirement credits that the deceased worker may have been receiving.
Father/Mother Benefits -- These benefits may be reduced if the family maximum applies or if the father or
mother is entitled to the own retirement benefit. In this case the father/mother benefit is redefined as the excess
over the father or mother’s own retirement benefit or zero, whichever is greater. Father /mother benefits are
also subject to the earnings test. On the other hand, they are not reduced for age. For those eligible to receive
both widow(er) and father/mother benefits, the program calculates both and takes the larger benefit.
Calculation of a Deceased Worker's PIA -- The calculation of survivor benefits in the case of a widow(er)
benefits uses the larger of two alternative calculation’s of the deceased worker's PIA. These are the "wage
indexing" method and the "re-indexing" method. Moreover, the year up to which the worker's wages are
indexed may be different depending upon whether the deceased worker would have become age 62 before or
after the widow(er) attains age 60.
The wage-indexing method -- the last year for indexing earnings is the earlier of a) the year the worker dies
minus 2 years or b) the year worker would have attained age 60. Bend point formula dollar amounts are taken
from the earlier of the year the worker dies or the year the worker would have attained age 62. The PIA thus
calculated is inflated by the CPI up to the year the widow(er) turns age 60 (if later) to obtain the PIA value on
which widower benefits would be based. Where applicable, these benefits are then adjusted for the family
maximum, reduction for age, delayed retirement credits, and the earnings test.
The reindexing method -- The worker's original earnings are indexed up to the earlier of the year the widow(er)
attains age 58 or b) the year the worker attains age 60. The elapsed years are computed as the number of years
from 1951 (or the worker's age 22 if later) through the year the widow(er) attains age 60. The computation
years equal elapsed years minus 5 years (computation years cannot be less than 2). Bend point formula dollar
values are applied from the year the widow(er) attains age 60. There is no subsequent indexing of the PIA for
inflation.
The Sequencing of Widow(er) Benefit Calculations -- Widow(er) benefit reductions follow these steps: First
the widow(er) plus children's benefits are subjected to the family maximum. Second, the widow(er) benefit is
reduced for early entitlement (of the widow(er) prior to normal retirement age). Third, the widow(er) benefit is
compared to the widow(er) own retirement benefit if entitled to the latter. Fourth, the widow(er) benefit is
redefined as the excess over own benefit if own benefit is positive. Finally the earnings test is applied, first to
the widow(er)'s own benefit and then to the widow(er) benefit that is in excess of own benefit. If the widow(er)
benefit is eliminated as a result of these tests, the benefits payable on the insured worker's  record are subjected
to the family maximum test again, treating the widow(er) as though he/she were not eligible for the widow(er)
benefit. This procedure can potentially increase children's benefits if the family maximum limit was binding
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